*An Argument for DAC*

1. Demonstrative concepts exist

2. Demonstrative concepts achieve reference by defer to a representation

3. Motor representations represent outcomes and ground purposiveness

4. We experience actions in ways shaped by motor representation of actions

5. Demonstrative action concepts which refer by deferring to motor representations are available to us

*DAC allow us to solve IP*

There is a interface problem

Where demonstrative action concepts feature an intention, the interface problem is solved

In intending to act, either the intention's execution involves further intentions or the action concepts which are constituents of the intention's content are DAC which refer by deferring to motor representation.

This means not only that there are actions (motor actions) whose directedness can be grounded in representations which are different from the propositional ones (i.e. there are actions whose intentionality does not imply any intention) but also that no intentions refer to actions involving bodily movements except ultimately by deferring to motor representations.